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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper revisits the role of business saving in the economy by critically scrutinizing the 
existing macroeoconomic and corporate finance literatures. We assemble and exploit a broad 
international, unbalanced panel of 47 countries over 1995-2013 on saving and investment by 
institutional sector to shed new light on the relevance of business saving for private saving and 
investment around the world. We show that businesses contribute on average more than 50% of 
national saving around the world. Using this unique dataset, we find evidence of partial 
piercing of the corporate veil: a $1 increase in business saving gives rise to a decrease of 
approximately $0.40 in household saving–thereby raising private saving by as much as $0.60. 
We also find that a $1 increase in business saving increases private investment by as much as 
$0.20 in countries where limited financing is a binding constraint on firms’ invesment. The 
evidence suggests that business saving and external financing are complementary sources of 
financing for investment. 
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Introduction 
The Chinese saving rate in the late 2000s reached an impressive record of 54% of GDP, 
half of which was generated by the corporate sector (see Huang, 2011). Back in Latin 
America, 74% of the private saving rate in Chile in 2011 had the same origin (see 
Central Bank of Chile, 2013). According to IMF (2006), businesses accounted for 70% of 
private saving in G7 countries in the early 2000s, up from 50% in the early 1990s. 
In light of these figures, it is no wonder that business saving (defined as cash flows –net 
revenues plus depreciation- minus dividends) plays a primary role on corporate 
investment.3 In fact, these retained earnings appear to be by far the main source of 
business financing. Fan, Titman and Twite (2012) compile data on more than 36,000 
listed firms in 39 countries in 1991-2006; they conclude that the median debt-to-assets 
ratio in developing countries is just 26%, implying that three quarters of total assets is 
financed with equity, most of it internally generated. For six big Latin American 
countries in 2009, Bebczuk and Galindo (2010) find this ratio to be also 26%. For 
developed economies, the number is still lower (20%), suggesting that the heavy 
reliance on internal funds cannot be traced to differences in institutional, economic or 
financial development, and also affects big, listed firms, not to mention the small. If 
anything, it stands out as an international stylized fact. 
Data on financing flows of firms reinforce this conclusion. Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt 
and Maksimovic (2010) present data from the Enterprise Surveys administered by the 
World Bank on some 40,000 firms in 67 countries. They report that internal funds cover 
59.2% of financing needs in low income countries, 59.3% in middle income countries, 
and 58.2% in high income economies. For Latin America, this percentage is 60.5%. Much 
in line with the previous leverage data, this pattern looks unrelated to country group 
characteristics. This holds irrespectively of firm size. Beck (2007) also uses the 
Enterprise Surveys for 71 developing countries to show that internal funding covers 
66% of investment in small firms (less than 20 workers), 60% in medium firms (20-99 
workers) and 58% in big firms (100+ workers). As small firms tend to be informal for 
the most part, these self-financing ratios hint that informality is not the sole factor 
giving rise to a link between business investment and saving.  
                                                          
3 Just to be clear, business saving forms part of private saving along with household saving. National 
saving is the sum of private saving (business plus household) and public saving. Business saving is 
sometimes referred to as corporate saving, retained earnings, undistributed cash flows, internal funds, or 
own funds. 
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These figures notwithstanding, the saving of businesses remains a largely neglected 
topic in the macroeconomic literature. As far as saving studies are concerned, the bulk 
of the empirical work leaves aside business saving. For instance, Loayza, Schmidt-
Hebbel and Servén (2000), one of the more influential studies on private saving in the 
last 15 years, plainly omits the discussion of business saving. More recently, the same 
goes for Horioka and Wan (2006), Mody, Ohnsorge and Sandri (2012) and Aizenman 
and Noy (2013). In the Latin American context, two recent reports on saving in the 
region, yet looking at the interplay between private and public saving, do not cover 
business saving separately (see IDB, 2013, and CEPAL, 2013).The only recent exception , 
in that business saving is explicitly examined, is Grigoli, Herman and Schmidt-Hebbel 
(2014). 
This paper seeks to fill this gap by tackling three central questions: (1) Why should 
business saving be front and center in the analysis of national saving?; (2) How has 
business saving behaved around the world in the last two decades?; and (3) What is the 
empirical link of business saving with overall private saving, on one hand, and with 
business investment, on the other?  
In order to answer these questions, we will review the existing international literature 
on the subject and assemble and exploit a novel saving and investment dataset by 
institutional sector (households, businesses, and the government) for 47developed and 
developing countries over 1995-2013. 
The paper will be organized as follows. In Section 1 we go over the literature linking 
business saving with private and national saving and investment. In Section 2 we 
provide some details on data sources and describe the main trends of saving and 
investment at the institutional sector level. Section 3 presents the empirical models 
explaining business saving and its relationship to national saving and investment. 
Section 4 provides the conclusions and policy implications. 
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1. Literature Review 
This section aims to shed light to the theoretical and empirical links between business 
saving and overall private saving, on the one hand, and business investment, on the 
other hand. This is done by critically scrutinizing the existing macroeconomic and 
corporate finance literatures about these topics. As shown next, the conclusions from 
this analysis defy conventional wisdom in more than one regard. 
Business, Household and Private Saving: The Corporate Veil Hypothesis 
As pointed out in the Introduction, the body of economic research on business saving is 
remarkably scarce, even more so when compared with the profuse literature on private 
and national saving. Two implicit assumptions and one practical fact seem to lie behind 
this disdain for the topic.  
Building on the basic circular flow model, the first assumption is that households save 
but do not invest, while firms invest but do not save. This assumption can be quickly 
ruled out after noticing, as observed in the Introduction, that businesses contribute with 
no less than 50% of private and national saving. The second assumption is that, even if 
not negligible, business saving is irrelevant to determine private saving because 
households pierce the corporate veil, an issue to be discussed momentarily and then 
resumed in Section 3. For now, it suffices to say that most of the evidence runs counter 
to this assumption, meaning that changes in business saving do have an impact on 
private and national saving.  
Finally, the practical fact has to do with the limited availability of business saving 
statistics, in turn associated to the lack of comprehensive balance sheet data on the 
business sector, especially in developing economies. While long time series on private 
and public saving are available for most countries, a much more restricted group has 
managed to produce and maintain business sector public information on a 
representative set of firms.4 The information collected for the present paper intends to 
overcome this gap. 
                                                          
4A few decades ago, only developed countries had national accounts by institutional sector. Over the last 
two decades a growing number of emerging countries has followed. 
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The seminal scholarly paper drawing direct attention towards business saving is 
Poterba (1987).5 After taking note that corporations contributed with 50% of private 
saving in the 1960s as well as in the 1980s, Poterba goes on to posit the corporate veil 
hypothesis, according to which households take full account of the saving made by 
businesses on their behalf –that is, households pierce the corporate veil—.  
The argument relies on the fact that households are the ultimate owners of firms, and 
thus they adjust their saving plans in the face of changes in business saving. Under the 
permanent income theory, consumption decisions are based on the present value of 
labor income and dividend revenues. If firms change their current saving by, say, 
increasing current dividends, households would not modify their initial desired 
consumption and saving because, for a given present value of profits, higher present 
dividends would be compensated by lower future dividends, leaving permanent 
income unchanged. Consequently, the additional dividends will be fully saved, 
implying a complete offset between the diminished business saving and the raised 
personal saving. In other words, private saving does not change because the private 
sector’s intertemporal budget constraint does not change either, and therefore the split 
between household and business saving is immaterial for any policy purpose.  
However, Poterba (1987) acknowledged the various empirical shortcomings that can 
invalidate the full piercing of the corporate veil. Most prominently, empirical outcomes 
can depart from the theory in the presence of asymmetric information and bounded 
rationality. Asymmetric information in financial markets can lead to household 
financial constraints, under which these units will be prone to spend all or part of the 
extra current disposable income made available by the augmented dividends. In turn, 
bounded rationality may turn people unconcerned about the future and adopt myopic 
consumption strategies solely based on current disposable income (see Bebczuk, 2000).6 
The resulting empirical prediction is that an increase (reduction) in business saving will 
give rise to an increase (reduction) in private saving. If such neutrality is broken, 
                                                          
5 As a matter of fact, Poterba (1987) cites a pioneer paper by Edward Denison (1955) that uncovers a 
higher stability of gross private saving vis-à-vis household and business saving, a phenomenon that 
Denison interprets as evidence of offsetting between the latter. 
6 By turning any predictions about the future imprecise and unreliable, excessive economic volatility is 
also likely to cause shortsightedness. Uncertainty also affects consumption via a higher propensity to 
consume out of cash dividends vis-à-vis capital gains, as the latter tend to have a larger temporary 
component than dividends, whose changes are usually of a more permanent nature (see Campbell, Lo 
and MacKinlay, 1997). This problem is exacerbated when secondary capital markets are illiquid and/or 
inefficient, or stock holdings cannot be used as collateral in borrowing from the banking system, because 
in those cases capital gains become poor substitutes for cash dividends. 
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movements in business saving may prove to be a powerful instrument in changing 
national saving.7 
A handful of papers have investigated the empirical nexus between household and 
business saving, concluding for the most part that the corporate veil holds, but only 
partially. Poterba (1987) finds for the U.S. over 1950-1986 that a $1 change in business 
saving translates into about $0.30 change in the same direction in private saving. Pitelis 
(1987) empirical results for the UK cast doubt on the perfect substitution hypothesis 
between personal saving and corporate retained earnings. IMF (2006) documents the 
relentless increase of business saving in the G7 since 1970, both as a ratio of GDP (from 
about8% in 1970 to 12% in 2004) and a ratio of total private saving (from 44% to 73% 
between those years). Although a graphical analysis suggests a compensating effect 
between household and business saving, this paper does not pursue any econometric 
estimation. IMF (2009) observes a similar behavior in Asian emerging countries, and in 
this case a panel regression delivers an offset coefficient of 0.8, even though the result 
for a broader set of emerging economies proves non-significant. Bebczuk (2000) looks at 
the seven largest countries in Latin America during 1990-1996, and obtains a coefficient 
of 0.61. In their household saving regression, Grigoli, Herman and Schmidt-Hebbel 
(2014) find a corporate saving coefficient of -0.58, significantly lower than the -1 
predicted by the pure corporate veil. This estimate implies that an additional dollar of 
corporate saving translates into an increase of 0.42 cents in private saving.8 
In this paper we revisit these estimates using a new dataset of 47 developed and 
developing countries over 1995-2013. Like most of the previous studies, we also find 
evidence of partial piercing of the corporate veil, albeit with different magnitudes. The 
bottom line is that, by and large, the available empirical evidence runs counter to the 
assumption of full neutrality of business saving in the economy.  
Business Saving and Investment 
The second empirical issue being tackled in this paper is whether business saving 
boosts or hinder business investment.9 To some extent contradictory answers have been 
                                                          
7 The reader may easily find several points in common between the corporate veil and the Ricardian 
equivalence hypotheses. While the former deals with the offset between household and business saving, 
the latter does it with private and public saving. 
8 An exception is Jongwanich (2010). He finds evidence for Thailand that a 1%increase in corporate 
savings brings about a 1.29% decline in household savings in the short-run and a 1.39% reduction in the 
long-run. 
9 A closely related, but still distinct, research strand has focused on corporate liquidity. Decisions on cash 
holding must not be confused with business saving decisions: business saving (net revenue plus 
depreciation) can be allocated to fixed assets or current assets, and cash appears as part of the second 
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offered to this question from the macroeconomics and corporate finance fields.10 Within 
the realm of finance, the seminal Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) analysis suggests that 
business saving (that is, internal funding) is irrelevant, as all, inside and outside, 
financing sources are perfect substitutes. However, this is only true under strong and 
highly unrealistic assumptions, including the absence of taxes, intermediation costs and 
asymmetric information. In particular, the prevalence of adverse selection and moral 
hazard breaks the equivalence between internal and external finance. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) puts forward the pecking order theory, claiming that, based on 
their relative cost, businesses first exhaust their availability of internal funds, then they 
tap the debt market (starting with secured debt) and finally, as a last resort, they issue 
stock. A direct corollary from this model is that a higher volume of internal cash flows 
would lead to more investment. This  was first tested by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen 
(1988), followed by a vast number of applications for different countries and periods, 
which lent overall support to this hypothesis (see Hubbard, 1998, for a survey). All in 
all, corporate finance highlights several advantages of internal over external funds, 
namely: (1) Internal funds are uncontaminated by intermediation and information costs 
disturbing external finance markets (see Bebczuk, 2003); (2) Since all risks are borne by 
the entrepreneur, the distorted incentives linked to limited liability are contained. In 
particular, beyond some threshold, a high debt ignites a conflict of interest between 
creditors and borrowers, whereby the latter might lean toward riskier projects (asset 
substitution) or just pass up good investment opportunities (the debt overhang 
syndrome, see Myers, 1977); and (3) Compared to outside debt (but not outside equity), 
internal funding does not create a fixed obligation for the firm, reducing default risk in 
the face of adverse shocks. 
Despite the pivotal role of self-financing in actual data and in the finance literature, 
there exists no empirical macroeconomic work directly assessing the connection 
between business investment and saving. If anything, ever since McKinnon (1973), 
macroeconomics has largely endorsed the position that internal funding is a suboptimal 
response to underdeveloped financial markets. In that regard, a prolific body of work 
was set off in the early 1990s on the positive nexus between financial intermediation, 
investment and growth (see Levine, 2005, for a survey). The notion that intermediated 
saving is growth-enhancing (relative to the non-intermediated business saving) is 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
category -in fact, firms can accumulate cash with or without saving. An example of this mix-up between 
cash hoarding and business saving is IMF (2006), which titles the piece “Awash with Cash: Why is 
Business Saving so High?”. 
10 A much more detailed account of the different views on business saving, investment and growth can be 
found in a previous version of this paper. See Bebczuk and Cavallo (2014). 
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rooted in the inaccurate assumption that all private saving is made by households. If 
that were true, the absence of a financial system would involve millions and millions of 
small and decentralized loans from surplus households to firms and other households 
in search of funding. This bilateral and atomized lending activity would surely be 
inefficient -due to diseconomies of scale- and entail sizable undiversified risks and low 
productivity -because of the inability of the typical household to select good borrowers 
and then control them until repayment-. In some other cases, lacking good outside 
opportunities to invest in, or a bank to delegate this task to, households would reinvest 
their saving in low-productivity activities of their own.11 As banks and markets 
agglutinate saving and have a comparative advantage in minimizing informational and 
transaction costs, the amount and quality of investment are both bound to be larger.  
But things look utterly different if we accept that firms save. Faced with an external 
finance premium, a rational entrepreneur would retain part of the cash flows generated 
to cover investment needs. Recalling that internal funds are free from intermediation 
costs and informational frictions, it is optimal for firms to exhaust internal finance 
before resorting to external finance. In other words, the financial system is undeniably 
helpful at allocating household saving, but firms are undeniably better than banks at 
allocating their own saving.  
Let us think the problem in a slightly more formal way. Suppose that ri is the 
opportunity cost of internal funds (say, the deposit interest rate), re is the required 
return by outside investors, or cost of external funds (say, the loan interest rate), and 
f’(k) is the marginal productivity of capital, where k is the capital stock and f’’(k)<0. 
Assuming financial frictions (i.e., ri< re) and that f’(k) is high enough, profit maximizing 
firms will minimize their overall cost of capital by exhausting their internal funding, 
and then will tap external markets up to the point in which f’(k) = re. If the intensity of 
the financial friction somehow lessens (for example, as a result of a more creditor-
friendly legal and economic environment), re would go down and thus investment will 
go up. But as long as ri is strictly below re, firms will keep on relying on their own 
resources to the extent possible and only then would try to obtain external financing.12 
After a relaxation of financial frictions, the level of internal funding would remain the 
                                                          
11 McKinnon (1973) presents the example of a poor rice farmer who, having no access to banking services, 
decides to store seed for next year in his barn, but the seed goes bad. 
12If no imperfections of any sort plagued financial markets (i.e., ri = re), then that would be the 
Modigliani-Miller world, where the distribution between household and business saving is irrelevant; as 
would be the very existence of a financial system. 
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same, but the access to external resources would likely increase. 13 As this sketch of a 
model illustrates, business saving is the optimal choice for the firm in a world where 
Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) neutrality is broken. In such a case business saving is not 
just a poor substitute to outside financing, but the first, optimal choice.  
An implication of these arguments is that business saving should be positively 
correlated with business investment. This is because firms always use, when available, 
internal funds to invest. The correlation is likely to be stronger when firms face a 
constrained access to external financing, as financial constraints limit the ability of firms 
to invest above and beyond their internal resources.  
There are, however, arguments suggesting that the sign of the correlation between 
business saving and investment may be different. If firms do not have good investment 
opportunities, and they already save more than what they invest, then incremental 
business saving may not dent business investment. Moreover, recall that business 
saving and investment are linked through the following accounting identity: 
Investment + Change in Other Assets = Saving + External Financing 
This implies that the correlation between investment (or gross capital formation) and 
saving depends on the availability of external financing, and also on the alternative uses 
of funds. Although a detailed analysis of the uses of funds (including cash hoarding, for 
example) by firms is beyond the scope of this paper, it must be kept in mind that these 
alternative uses of funds (i.e., other than gross capital formation) may weaken the 
correlation between business saving and investment in the data. For example, even in 
the extreme case that the firm is altogether excluded from financial markets, the 
correlation between investment and saving may be well below 1 if saving is to some 
extent applied to hoard cash (or invest in other liquid assets).  
The bottom-line is that the strength of the correlation between business saving and 
investment is, therefore, an empirical question, and we next employ the newly 
assembled dataset on sectorial saving and investment to produce an answer. 
2. Data 
This section is devoted to the presentation and exploratory analysis of our database on 
gross saving and investment by institutional sector. As mentioned in the Introduction, 
one of the reasons why business saving is under-investigated is the relative scarcity of 
                                                          
13Ameliorating financial frictions would increase the ratio of external to internal funding, but only 
because of improved conditions for the intermediation of household saving. 
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data when compared to national and even private sector figures. Our paper aims to fill 
this gap by assembling a broad international, unbalanced dataset of 47 countries with 
annual data spanning the 1995-2013 period. Subsection 2.1 explains some saving 
measurement issues, and Subsection 2.2 describes major data trends. 
2.1 Saving by Institutional Sector: Measurement Issues 
Our analysis centers on the behavior of gross saving rates by institutional sector. This 
section briefly explains how these figures are constructed and the practical statistical 
challenges lying behind them.14 In addition, we comment on our data sources and 
cleansing procedures. 
Our main variable of interest is gross business saving. The business sector includes 
corporations as well as unincorporated enterprises. Corporations are enterprises having 
a legal identity separate from that of its owners. Corporations include financial (such as 
banks, insurance companies and other financial intermediaries) and non-financial 
entities. Unlike corporations, unincorporated enterprises (run by household members 
managing family firms) are not required to publish a complete set of accounts. Due to 
this lack of data, national accounts generally combine information on households and 
unincorporated firms. By the same token –namely, the need to have accounting 
records—, informal firms are typically excluded from national accounts statistics.  
Therefore, in national accounts, business sector statistics pertain to corporations only. 
The main data source is the tax returns these firms file at least once a year. From this 
data, gross business saving is calculated in the following way: the first item in the 
sequence, taken from the Production Account, is Gross Value Added, which equals total 
sector’s Output minus Intermediate Consumption: 
Gross Value Added (GVA) = Output – Intermediate Consumption    (1) 
The Generation of Income Account shows how the value added is distributed between 
the factors of production (i.e., labor and capital). The total cost of labor is labeled as 
Compensation of Employees, and includes both net wages and salaries as well as 
employees’ and employers’ social contributions. The remuneration of the capital factor 
                                                          
14 This section heavily borrows from Lequiller and Blades (2006), who explain in great detail the 
construction of national accounts according to common international practices. 
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–i.e., the Gross Operation Surplus (GOS)—is calculated as Gross Value Added minus 
Compensation of Employees:15 
 
Gross Operating Surplus (GOS) = GVA – Employee Compensation                            (2) 
At the third stage, the Distribution of Income Account displays how the GOS is 
allocated between interest and dividends (or Property Income) and income taxes. The 
remaining resources represent Gross Business Saving. 
Gross Business Saving  = GOS – Interest Payments – Dividends – Income Tax         (3) 
The excess of Gross Capital Formation over Gross Business Saving (or self-financing) is 
referred to as Net Borrowing (or Net Lending, whenever Gross Business Saving exceeds 
Gross Capital Formation), and includes the change in the stock of financial assets held 
by the firms.16 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑜𝑟 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔=𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔−𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (4) 
To convert gross into net firm saving, the consumption of fixed capital (or depreciation) 
needs to be subtracted from gross saving. The consumption of fixed capital is defined as 
the decline in the current value of fixed assets as a result of physical deterioration or 
normal obsolescence. Gross, as opposed to net, firm saving is our variable of interest for 
two reasons: first, net saving is relevant for an economic growth analysis but not from 
an overall sources-and-uses of funds perspective as the one underlying our paper; 
second, for most countries, net saving figures are just unavailable. 
Regarding the household sector saving, the lack of accounting information and the 
questionable reliability of national household surveys has led national accountants to 
employ indirect sources of data and to make some simplifying assumptions at the time 
of constructing disposable income and consumption statistics. In this light, this sector 
typically merges households, unincorporated businesses and non-profit institutions 
                                                          
15 The measurement of after-tax profits according to company accounting rules is partly different from the 
national accounts counterpart (Gross Operating Surplus minus Interest and Income Tax). The main 
differences are that: (i) Company amortization is based on a straight-line depreciation over the original 
purchase price, while national accounts depreciation applies a depreciation coefficient to the current 
value of each capital asset; (ii) Company accounts include exceptional losses and profits, not considered 
in the national accounts; and (iii) Only profits made on national territory are recorded in the national 
accounts, where company books include profits made by overseas subsidiaries.   
16The Capital Account describes the process by which Gross Capital Formation (including Fixed Capital 
Formation and Changes in Inventories) is financed. 
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serving households (NPISH). The latter is a small sector, without much incidence on 
aggregate figures, and, considering that is financed by and serves households, can be 
assimilated to this sector. As for unincorporated businesses, given that they have no 
legal obligation to prepare accounting records, it is normally difficult to disentangle 
labor from capital income.17 In such cases, a Mixed Income account is reported that 
estimates the overall income of those unincorporated businesses based on the average 
income of self-employed household members. In terms of data sources, household 
consumption is computed from retail sales figures compiled by national institutes of 
statistics, after deducting the portion of sales going to firms as intermediate 
consumption or investment. Household income is drawn from national labor statistics, 
in turn based on business and government payroll data. Business accounts provide 
information on dividend income, and the balance of payments on net income from 
foreign sources (including interest, dividends and remittances). Social contributions, 
benefits and transfers as well as tax payments, all needed to compute household 
disposable income, are taken from government accounts. Financial corporations’ data 
may be also used to record interest payments and income as well as contributions and 
pensions managed by pension funds and life insurance companies. In sum, household 
saving is computed as a residual –the difference between disposable income and final 
consumption expenditure—. Therefore, the quality of this saving measure depends on 
the quality of the two abovementioned variables.  
The calculation of gross government saving (total revenues minus total expenditures 
plus gross capital formation) is considerably less problematic. This is because 
government finances accounts are more transparent and publicly scrutinized than their 
private sector counterparts.18 
Homogenized and comprehensive international data on saving and investment by 
institutional sector is available from three public sources: United Nations National 
Accounts, OECD National Accounts, and IMF’s World Economic Outlook.19 The United 
Nations, through its Statistics Division, is the international standard-setting 
organization in the area of national accounting. This agency contributes to the 
international coordination, development and implementation of the System of National 
                                                          
17 This segregation is only possible in full only for quasi-corporations, which are unincorporated but keep 
full business accounts, and are thus included as part of the corporations sector. 
18 State-owned enterprises that provide commercial services to the private sector are generally considered 
part of the corporations sector. According to UN principles, public corporations charging market prices 
or prices that cover over 50 percent of costs are excluded from the government sector. 
19In the case of WEO, the data is disaggregated between private and public saving. There is no distinction 
within private saving between household and firm saving. 
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Accounts (SNA). The vast majority of countries and regional and multilateral 
organizations worldwide adhere to UN guidelines. Therefore, we chose the UN dataset 
as the primary source.  
A detailed inspection of the sectorial saving data from the three sources reveals that 
there are some discrepancies even when the series overlap for a given country. This is 
notwithstanding that in principle the data is harmonized with the 2008 System of 
National Accounts (SNA) and it comes from the same primary sources. This suggests 
that there may be differences in the way the data is aggregated and/or further 
harmonized across datasets. Given that the origin of the discrepancies is not explained 
in any of the three sources, we implemented a crude procedure to cleanse our dataset. 
We eliminate all observations where the difference between the value reported for a 
given observation corresponding to the same series in any two databases was equal or 
above three percentage points of GDP; moreover we removed the country from the 
sample when that discrepancy was detected in more than two years.20 Therefore, we are 
only keeping the cross-country data that is consistent across the available data sources.  
The usable sample, by year and income country group (high income OECD, high 
income non-OECD, upper-middle income and lower-middle income) is presented in 
Table 2.1. It comprises an unbalanced panel of 47 countries over 1995-2013. The list of 
countries and the period with available data appears in the Annex, along with the data 
sources. 
2.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2.2 shows the gross private saving rate as a percentage of GDP for the whole 
sample and each country group.21 Central to our work, Tables 2.3 and 2.4 display the 
contribution of the household sector and the business sector, respectively, to the private 
saving rate. For the entire sample over 1995-2013, households explain between 37% and 
49%, and hence businesses generate between 51% and 63% of private savings. This 
implies that the business sector is the main saving-generating economic unit around the 
world and for all country groups. 
                                                          
20 UN data looks in general similar, but not identical, to IMF data on government and private saving (the 
IMF does not present separate data for households and businesses), while OECD rates show some 
discrepancies when compared with the previous ones. Another overall conclusion is that differences 
between the three sources widen for lower income countries, possibly reflecting data quality issues. This 
explains why, after applying our simple data cleansing criterion, only middle and high income countries 
survived in the usable sample. 
21 Group values are PPP GDP-weighted averages. Given that these weights change year by year and that 
the sample is not fully balanced, comparisons across groups and time are not entirely meaningful. 
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Tables 2.5 and 2.6 report gross private investment as a percentage of GDP, and the 
proportion of business to private investment, respectively. In particular, Table 2.6 
shows that business investment accounts for between 67% and 73% of private 
investment. The rest of private investment is done by households as residential 
construction. Since business saving should affect business but not household 
investment, and the latter is driven by a different set of variables, it is reasonable to 
focus on business investment in the empirical section. Therefore we will use business 
investment instead of private investment as the dependent variable in Section 3. 
With a view to our econometric work in Section 3, a quick test of the corporate veil 
offset is the simple correlation between household and business saving. If the corporate 
veil holds to some degree, such correlation should a priori be negative. In our dataset, 
this coefficient for the whole panel is -0.22, and for the different country samples ranges 
between -0.18 and -0.51, as seen in Table 2.7. Except for the lower middle income group 
(-0.18 but significant at 10%), the remaining correlation coefficients are significant at 1%. 
Similarly, we argued in Section 1 that a positive link between business saving and 
business investment may emerge, particularly in countries where financial frictions are 
likely to bind. Simple correlations displayed in Table 2.7 preliminarily support this 
hypothesis, with positive and highly significant correlations (between 0.31 and 0.72) for 
the whole sample and all country groups, except for lower middle income countries 
(0.19 but significant at 10%). 
Finally, Table 2.8 calls attention towards the ratio of business saving to business 
investment. As shown in the table, business saving constitutes a very high proportion of 
business investment in all groups; moreover, the share often exceeds unity. For the 
overall sample in 1995-2013, this ratio takes a minimum value of 84% and a maximum 
of 117%. This is suggestive of a high internal funding reliance at the international level. 
However, the fact that the correlation is not always 1 also points to the fact that firms 
use internal funds also to acquire other assets (i.e. cash hoarding) or to reduce liabilities.  
3. Econometric Evidence 
Testing the Corporate Veil Hypothesis 
In this section we put to the test the corporate veil hypothesis, which states that every 
change in the business saving is compensated by a change in the opposite direction in 
the household saving. Although in a frictionless setup this offset would be complete, 
the introduction of an array of market imperfections may attenuate such compensation. 
To proceed, we estimate a reduced-form private saving equation, defined as private 
saving (household + business) to gross domestic product. In order to deal with potential 
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endogeneity biases, a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) system framework is 
adopted to estimate our panel data model.22 
Specifically, we want to estimate the following equation: 
    (5) 
Where  is the ratio of private saving to output (i.e., the private saving rate);   is 
the business saving rate, is a set of control variables,  is a time-specific effect;  is 
a country-specific time-invariant effect; and  is the idiosyncratic error term.  
The System GMM approach uses a first-difference transformation of (5) to eliminate the 
unobserved country-specific effect , and internal lagged level instruments to replace 
the endogenous variables in the transformed difference equation. These lagged 
instruments are valid under the assumption that the independent variables are weakly 
exogenous. This means that they may be correlated with present and past error terms 
but not with future errors. The problem with this approach is that lagged variables are 
weak instruments in the presence of serial correlation. This is particularly problematic 
in the case of saving rates which typically show a great deal of persistence. In order to 
address this problem, system GMM additionally estimates the level equation using 
lagged differences as instruments for the contemporaneous level explanatory variables. 
The inclusion of two equations, one in differences and another one in levels, gives the 
“System” GMM estimator its name. Note that all regressions include time fixed effects 
 to control for period-specific events that may affect several countries at the same 
time.23 Moreover, all regressions include the small sample correction proposed by 
Windmeijer (2005) in order to obtain robust two-step standard errors. 
The main coefficient of interest is If households perfectly pierce the corporate veil, 
changes in business saving do not affect private saving as a whole, yielding a zero 
coefficient. Otherwise, in the face of a partial piercing, the business saving coefficient is 
expected to be positive but lower than one in magnitude, meaning that a $1 increase 
(decrease) in business saving gives way to a decrease (increase) of less than $1 in 
household saving.   
                                                          
22 We apply the System GMM estimator developed in Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). This estimator allows us to address the joint endogeneity of all 
explanatory variables in a dynamic formulation, and explicitly controls for potential biases arising from 
country specific effects. 
23 Also, the methodology employed assumes no correlation across countries in the idiosyncratic 
disturbances. Time dummies make this assumption more likely to hold (see Roodman 2006). 
16 
 
Building on previous contributions (see for example Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel and 
Serven, 2000), in addition to business saving, our regressions contain a number of 
controls usually incorporated in saving equations to account for income, fiscal, 
demographic and financial factors influencing such decisions.  
As can be seen in Tables 3.1 to 3.3, we run different specifications to assess the 
robustness of the reported coefficients.24 We start in Table 3.1, column 1, with a 
standard private saving equation including business saving among the regressors. 
Regarding our control set, we include the level and growth rate of real GDP, the degree 
of financial deepening (as measured by the M2/GDP ratio), the flow of private credit, 
the government saving rate, the urbanization rate, the old and young dependency 
ratios, and the rate of inflation. In column 2 and 3, we add the current account balance 
to GDP and the terms of trade, respectively, to the control set. The last column in Table 
3.1 adds the real interest rate and, as this variable is not available for some countries, 
sample size markedly falls from 597 to 432 observations. In all these regressions, the 
coefficient estimate β is statistically significant at 1%, and the point estimates varies 
within a narrow interval of 0.52 to 0.59. This implies that a $1 increase in business 
saving gives rise to only a partial offset of between $0.48 and $0.41 in household 
savings. 
While most, but not all, of the control variables display the expected sign, they typically 
happen to be fragile, in the sense that they are not consistently significant across the 
various reported regressions. The most robust controls are the lagged private saving 
rate is invariably significant -hinting at a strong inertial behavior in the series-, and 
government and foreign saving. Along with the finding regarding business saving, all 
points to some –but not a complete- degree of substitution among saving by different 
institutional sectors (households, businesses, government and the rest of the world). 
This is, in turn, consistent with the presence of financial constraints and/or some 
behavioral biases, such as myopia.  
To complete our econometric analysis, Table 3.2 features a GMM estimation of the 
household saving rate (instead of the private saving rate), while keeping the same 
control set. This change intends to address two foreseeable criticisms to previous 
regressions, namely, (a) Since business saving is on both the left and the right hand 
sides, this may be driving its positive loading, and (b) Strictly speaking, the theoretical 
                                                          
24 Furthermore, it is important to point out that both diagnostic statistics tests—for serial correlation and 
the validity of the instruments (i.e., the AR2 test and the Hansen-J test)—provide support for the chosen 
specification.  In particular, they show that there are no traces of second-order autocorrelation and that 
the over-identifying restrictions are not rejected at conventional levels of confidence. 
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arguments -and their empirical counterparts- explaining saving behavior apply to 
households and not necessarily to business, and therefore the proper dependent 
variable should be household instead of private saving.25 The results strongly reinforce 
earlier findings. In particular, business saving shows the expected negative sign with 
high statistical significance. Moreover, the quantitative short-run effect is consistent 
with that emerging from private saving regressions: the implicit offset coefficients 
derived from the private saving regressions in Table 3.1 (i.e. 0.41 to 0.48) are roughly 
similar to the coefficient estimates reported in Table 3.2 (i.e., 0.32 to 0.46). 
Subsequently, Table 3.3 shows some OLS results, first in a panel with fixed effects 
(column 1) and then in a cross-section regression (column 2). For the latter we simply 
collapse the annual observations in the panel to a single observation per country. 
Although these alternative specifications may not be free from bias, we opted to include 
them to test if the baseline results hold within the more straightforward and transparent 
context of OLS regressions. Interestingly, the results hold, corroborating that the 
estimated business saving effect is robust. 
Business Investment and Saving 
We now turn our attention to the link between business saving and business 
investment. To do so, we will perform standard investment regressions (see for instance 
Servén, 2003, and Cavallo and Daude, 2011) augmented with business saving as a novel 
regressor, and using business investment -instead of private investment as is customary 
in the literature—as the dependent variable.26 
The baseline specification is the following:     (2) 
Where  is the ratio of business investment to output;   is the business saving to 
output,  is a set of control variables,  is a time-specific effect;  is a country-
specific time-invariant effect; and is the idiosyncratic error term.  
                                                          
25For instance, the permanent income framework and its extensions over time were devised having 
consumers in mind -not firms, whose study pertains to the corporate finance field. 
26 The latter is motivated by the evidence presented in Table 2.6, and discussed in the preceding section, 
showing the business investment does not account for all of private sector investment. Household 
investment (i.e., residential construction) plays a non-negligible role.  
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The core regressions include two explanatory variables: the per capita GDP growth rate 
and the business saving rate. A model with such regressors loosely resembles the 
structure of the financial constraints micro tests in the tradition of Fazzari, Hubbard and 
Petersen (1988), where investment activity is assumed to solely depend on two factors: 
expected profitability, proxied by Tobin’s q, and the availability of internal cash flow. 
At the macro level, it is not simple to come up with a sound measure of expected 
profitability, but observed GDP growth is certainly taken as a signal by the business 
community. Servén and Solimano (1993) claim that changes in output are by far the 
main empirical explanation of investment changes in developing countries. This is 
somewhat puzzling in view of the allegedly forward-looking nature of investment 
activity and the less-than-persistent trajectory of GDP growth rates. Nevertheless, 
myopic behavior or the lack of other reliable sources of information for forecasting 
future profitability determine that private investment be prone to be highly sensitive to 
past or contemporaneous output growth.  
The second regressor is similar to the one employed in the financial constraints tests, 
with the difference that cash flow captures available internal funding before dividends 
and business saving is computed after dividend payout. A positive loading on business 
saving would hint that firms require internal funding to pursue their investment plans - 
external financing is either more expensive than their own saving, or downright non-
existent.  
Table 3.4 unveils a positive but mostly insignificant effect of business saving on 
business investment, with point estimates ranging between 0.075 and 0.140 (i.e., 
columns 1 to 5). This somewhat low coefficient estimate may respond to either a fluid 
access to credit by firms –which does not seem to be a realistic description of actual 
credit usage, as argued in Section 1- or the existence of other uses of funds beyond 
capital formation. The last column of Table 3.4 explores the sensitivity of this coefficient 
estimate to overall financial development in the country, by interacting business saving 
with a dummy variable taking value 1 if the private credit-to-GDP ratio is above the 
sample median in each year. If financial development at the country level relaxes 
financial constraints for firms, this interaction term should be negative, indicating a 
diminishing role of business saving as the banking system gets deeper. This is exactly 
what we observe in column 6, where the estimated coefficient on the interaction term is 
-0.068 (although it is not statistically significant). However, importantly, once we 
control by the interaction term, the coefficient estimate on business saving increases in 
absolute value to 0.17, and it becomes statistically significant at the 10% level.  
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As control variables, we include (i) the lagged dependent variable, to capture inertia; (ii) 
the volatility of GDP growth (measured by its standard deviation in the previous three 
years), as a proxy for macroeconomic uncertainty; (iii) the flow of private credit to GDP 
(the same variable included in saving regressions), to check whether changes in credit 
stimulates investment;27 (iv) government investment, so as to put the crowding-out 
hypothesis to the test, (v) Per capita GDP, to measure convergence (higher per capita 
GDP would imply higher capital stock and a lower marginal productivity of capital). 
Since per capita GDP may also capture other effects (such as institutional quality or 
political and economic stability), in the various specifications we replace GDP per capita 
by a measure of capital stock which is available from the Penn World Tables (PWT). In 
order to proxy for investment productivity, we also employ the relative investment 
price level (with an expected negative sign) and an index of total factor productivity 
(with a positive expected sign) that are also available from PWT database. Finally, all 
the regressions include year dummies to control for time effects. In general, with the 
notable exception of per capita GDP growth, none of the control variables enter the 
regression with statistically significant coefficient estimates. 
In Table 3.5 we repeat the panel estimation using a panel OLS with fixed effects, in 
which the coefficient estimate for business saving turns out to be non-significant once 
more. It is only in cross-section regressions that the coefficient estimate for business 
saving enters with a high estimate (0.40 and 0.32 in columns 3 and 4, respectively) that 
is also statistically significant. 
What may be the source of the weak link between business saving and investment in 
the data? As discussed in Section 1, it can be argued that saving may become a limiting 
factor for investment if the latter exceeds the former. Otherwise, changes in saving may 
not necessarily induce changes in investment. Saving and investment are driven by 
different factors (i.e., past revenues and dividends in the case of business saving, and 
expected profitability in the case of investment); therefore they can take quite different 
values for any particular economic unit. This implies in turn, that the theoretical 
correlation between the series is not necessarily positive, even in a world characterized 
by financial frictions (i.e., where the cost of external finance is always larger than the 
cost of internal finance). If this is true, then a business faced with a good investment 
opportunity will likely prefer to use its own saving as its first financing choice. But this 
is not the same as saying that an increase in business saving will generate an increase in 
business investment. A firm displaying low physical investment levels relative to their 
                                                          
27 Properly measured, the credit variable should only comprise commercial credit. However, such 
variable is not available for our broad set of countries and years. 
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saving availability can be reasonably assumed to have scarce investment opportunities 
at hand, in which case an exogenous saving increase is less likely to be channeled 
towards physical investment and more likely to be used to accumulate financial or 
other assets. A genuine financial constraint arises, on the contrary, when the firm 
expects high future returns, and consequently invests as much as possible, to the point 
that its own saving becomes a binding constraint to accept all profitable projects. Since 
the manager continues to prefer internal to external financing, additional saving is more 
likely to be used to buy new (or to replace depreciated) physical capital. For these 
businesses, investment is likely to be more sensitive to saving than others. 
To test this hypothesis, we construct a dummy variable taking value 1 if, for each 
particular year, business investment is greater than or equal to business saving.28 This 
binary variable is then interacted with business saving. If the argument is valid, this 
interaction should yield a positive and significant coefficient, after including the three 
constitutive terms in the regressions (saving, the new dummy variable and the 
interaction between them).29 The results reported in Table 3.6 lend support to this claim; 
the coefficient estimate on the interaction term is positive and significant, for a total 
effect of business saving of between 0.18 and 0.32. This is considerably higher than the 
estimates in Table 3.4. Moreover, the coefficient estimates for business saving are 
statistically significant at the 5% level.  
 
                                                          
28 In our database, business investment is equal or above business saving in 64% of total country-year 
observations. For the private and non-financial business sectors, this figure amounts to 48% and 72%, 
respectively. 
29 See Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006) about the econometric justification to include all three terms. 
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4. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Our paper has investigated the relevance of business saving for private saving and 
investment around the world by constructing and exploiting a broad international, 
unbalanced panel of 47 countries over 1995-2013. To lay the foundations of such 
empirical work, we first reviewed the literature on the subject, contrasting the treatment 
of business saving in the macroeconomic field -which for the most part views business 
saving as a poor substitute for external finance— and the corporate finance field –
according to which internal funding represents a profit maximizing choice in a world 
where the Modigliani and Miller neutrality does not hold—.  
On the statistical front, our first finding is that, contrary to the standard textbook model, 
businesses are the principal contributors to private and national saving. For the whole 
sample, the share of business to private saving has increased to 63% in 2013 from 52% in 
1995. Also, upon casual inspection of the cross country data, the higher the business 
saving rate, the higher the private saving and investment rates. From a theoretical 
standpoint, this link can be rationalized by invoking financial frictions and departures 
from the corporate veil hypothesis. To test these theories we have run private saving 
and private investment regressions on our panel. In brief, our results indicate that a $1 
increase in business saving increases private saving by approximately $0.59; and it 
increases private investment by approximately $0.20. Importantly, the last result holds 
only when firms in constrained by limited internal and external funding. We conclude 
that business saving is not neutral and, moreover, that it contributes positively to 
private saving and to business investment. 
The fact that firms save everywhere is understandable because there is an advantage for 
firms to finance investment through retained earnings in a world where Modigliani-
Miller breaks down (i.e. where there are costs to financial intermediation that can be 
dampened, but not entirely eliminated). Firms that are credit constrained may have no 
further options than to finance investment through their own saving. Therefore, 
ameliorating financial frictions would probably increase the ratio of external (i.e. credit) 
to internal (i.e. business saving) funding of these firms; however this is so because it 
would increase the availability of external funding for firms as a complement (rather than 
a substitute) of business saving. The policy implication is that business saving should be 
nurtured rather than discouraged. Our results show that higher business saving 
contributes to rising aggregate private saving and business investment in the economy. 
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How then to encourage business saving? Tax policy is a prime candidate for this task. In 
promoting private saving, the usual policy stand is to encourage household saving 
while to the extent possible preserving fiscal neutrality by raising corporate taxes. This 
conception is probably rooted in the mistaken prior that it is the household sector the 
preponderant source of saving in the economy. In the words of James Poterba (1987), 
“Although corporations are responsible for roughly half of private saving in the United States, 
most studies of saving focus exclusively on household behavior. Policy initiatives to increase 
saving have also concentrated on personal saving (…)”. This diagnosis has not changed 
much indeed since then. Both soft and hard evidence is astoundingly scarce, but it hints 
at a positive impact of a more lenient tax treatment on the earnings of formal businesses 
-obviously informal businesses would not benefit from such tax reform. In this regard, 
Vergara (2004) offers macro and micro evidence for Chile that the lowering of the tax 
rate on retained earnings from 50% to 10% over the 1980s was a significant factor in 
boosting private investment in subsequent years. In turn, PwC (2013) surveys the 
corporate income tax rate in 111 countries in 2012, concluding that the average statutory 
rate is 24.2% (within a 15%-30% range) and the actual rate paid, after some accounting 
adjustments, is 23.4%. Interestingly enough, 51% of the countries have lowered the 
statutory rate between 2006 and 2012. This latter fact may suggest that authorities may 
be becoming more aware of the positive effects of lower taxes on business as a catalyst 
of greater saving and investment rates. 
A final word of caution is that these recommendations do not contradict at all the 
conventional advice about nurturing the financial intermediation process. Business and 
personal saving both play a positive role on long-term growth. It is evident that, unlike 
personal saving, business saving, when reinvested in the firm, remains outside the 
financial system, but this does not entail a problem. In fact, these resources, largely 
immune to transaction and informational costs, should be used to the extent possible. 
But at the point where they are exhausted, banks and markets should be tapped to take 
advantage of all remaining profitable investment opportunities. 
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Table 2.1 
Country Coverage 
Number of Countries by Income Country Group 
 
Year/Income 
Group
High-income 
OECD
High-income 
non-OECD 
Upper-middle 
income 
Lower-middle 
income 
Total
1995 24 1 9 2 36
1996 24 2 10 3 39
1997 24 2 12 3 41
1998 24 2 13 4 43
1999 24 2 13 4 43
2000 24 2 13 5 44
2001 24 2 13 6 45
2002 24 2 14 6 46
2003 24 2 15 6 47
2004 24 2 15 6 47
2005 24 2 15 6 47
2006 24 2 15 6 47
2007 24 2 15 6 47
2008 24 2 15 6 47
2009 24 2 15 6 47
2010 24 2 14 6 46
2011 24 2 13 6 45
2012 23 2 12 4 41
2013 20 0 7 0 27  
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Table 2.2 
Gross Private Saving to GDP 
Weighted by PPP GDP 
 
Year/Income 
Group
High-income 
OECD
High-income 
non-OECD 
Upper-middle 
income 
Lower-middle 
income 
Total
1995 24.2 16.5 32.0 7.0 25.5
1996 23.7 16.2 29.1 14.9 24.6
1997 23.5 14.0 29.0 15.7 24.5
1998 21.1 13.5 27.9 15.4 22.0
1999 19.8 14.0 26.3 16.6 20.7
2000 19.4 14.6 26.6 17.8 20.8
2001 19.7 15.9 29.9 20.5 21.8
2002 20.8 15.8 29.1 21.7 22.9
2003 21.2 18.1 29.1 24.0 23.5
2004 21.2 19.3 29.8 25.7 23.9
2005 20.5 18.6 29.2 24.5 23.2
2006 20.3 18.0 30.4 21.1 23.5
2007 19.7 15.0 31.7 20.6 23.7
2008 19.9 15.6 32.1 22.0 24.2
2009 22.6 16.9 33.2 20.1 26.3
2010 23.3 18.7 37.0 21.8 27.8
2011 22.8 19.2 35.8 20.8 27.1
2012 22.6 17.7 19.0 18.8 21.9
2013 20.6 n.a. 16.5 n.a. 20.5  
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Table 2.3 
Household to Private Saving (in %) 
Weighted by PPP GDP 
 
Year/Income 
Group
High-income 
OECD
High-income 
non-OECD 
Upper-middle 
income 
Lower-middle 
income 
Total
1995 48.0 37.3 49.6 15.7 48.3
1996 45.7 41.5 57.2 40.4 48.7
1997 44.2 11.4 55.5 44.8 47.3
1998 43.7 19.6 52.4 43.8 45.4
1999 40.7 54.3 50.2 39.6 42.5
2000 40.5 46.1 46.5 45.2 42.1
2001 40.8 42.0 45.6 41.1 42.1
2002 39.4 32.6 43.8 35.2 40.7
2003 38.2 29.7 46.0 38.7 41.0
2004 36.8 34.7 43.7 39.6 39.4
2005 34.4 30.7 45.3 39.5 38.7
2006 35.3 26.3 45.9 35.4 39.6
2007 35.5 21.4 45.8 37.6 40.1
2008 38.1 23.7 45.9 29.8 41.5
2009 39.3 44.8 48.7 35.7 43.5
2010 34.7 45.5 50.7 39.2 41.8
2011 35.2 38.8 51.2 35.8 42.4
2012 36.7 39.3 39.0 41.1 37.2
2013 37.9 n.a. 16.3 n.a. 37.4  
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Table 2.4 
Business to Private Saving (in %) 
Weighted by PPP GDP 
Year/Income 
Group
High-income 
OECD
High-income 
non-OECD 
Upper-middle 
income 
Lower-middle 
income 
Total
1995 52.0 62.7 50.4 84.3 51.7
1996 54.3 58.5 42.8 59.6 51.3
1997 55.8 88.6 44.5 55.2 52.7
1998 56.3 80.4 47.6 56.2 54.6
1999 59.3 45.7 49.8 60.4 57.5
2000 59.5 53.9 53.5 54.8 57.9
2001 59.2 58.0 54.4 58.9 57.9
2002 60.6 67.4 56.2 64.8 59.3
2003 61.8 70.3 54.0 61.3 59.0
2004 63.2 65.3 56.3 60.4 60.6
2005 65.6 69.3 54.7 60.5 61.3
2006 64.7 73.7 54.1 64.6 60.4
2007 64.5 78.6 54.2 62.4 59.9
2008 61.9 76.3 54.1 70.2 58.5
2009 60.7 55.2 51.3 64.3 56.5
2010 65.3 54.5 49.3 60.8 58.2
2011 64.8 61.2 48.8 64.2 57.6
2012 63.3 60.7 61.0 58.9 62.8
2013 62.1 n.a. 83.7 n.a. 62.6  
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Table 2.5 
Gross Private Investment to GDP 
Weighted by PPP GDP 
Year/Income 
Group
High-income 
OECD
High-income 
non-OECD 
Upper-middle 
income 
Lower-middle 
income 
Total
1995 20.0 18.1 29.5 21.8 22.8
1996 19.7 18.0 27.4 17.5 21.9
1997 19.9 19.8 26.7 14.7 21.8
1998 19.5 16.9 25.6 17.7 20.7
1999 19.5 15.5 25.2 14.8 20.5
2000 20.0 14.0 25.0 15.3 20.9
2001 19.0 15.8 26.1 15.4 20.4
2002 18.1 21.3 25.0 15.4 19.8
2003 18.0 20.7 25.8 16.6 20.2
2004 18.6 21.6 27.3 15.5 21.1
2005 19.1 22.0 26.8 17.3 21.4
2006 19.5 23.6 27.9 19.1 22.2
2007 19.5 23.9 28.6 20.9 22.5
2008 18.5 25.5 30.5 22.1 22.8
2009 15.0 20.1 31.2 16.9 20.9
2010 16.3 17.9 34.2 17.5 22.2
2011 16.8 16.8 35.4 17.8 23.1
2012 16.8 16.0 20.7 14.6 17.3
2013 16.2 n.a. 16.5 n.a. 16.2  
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Table 2.6 
Business to Private Investment (in %) 
Weighted by PPP GDP 
Year/Income 
Group
High-income 
OECD
High-income 
Non-OECD 
Upper-middle 
income 
Lower-middle 
income 
Total
1995 66.6 56.0 81.9 82.2 72.6
1996 66.4 53.3 78.2 80.0 71.2
1997 67.8 73.6 78.8 74.4 72.2
1998 66.6 69.4 80.0 72.5 70.1
1999 66.7 77.7 80.5 72.4 70.1
2000 67.4 72.9 76.3 71.9 69.6
2001 66.3 71.4 77.0 71.3 69.3
2002 64.2 75.1 75.8 72.6 68.1
2003 63.0 76.9 74.0 77.5 67.3
2004 62.4 73.5 73.1 78.2 66.8
2005 62.3 76.7 70.7 75.6 65.8
2006 63.4 77.0 74.7 80.0 68.3
2007 65.8 75.6 75.9 81.4 70.4
2008 67.9 76.0 77.2 79.9 72.6
2009 66.1 76.7 74.5 76.6 70.9
2010 69.7 75.5 75.8 77.3 73.0
2011 70.4 75.4 73.1 76.7 71.9
2012 70.0 76.7 75.8 78.4 71.3
2013 66.4 n.a. 88.4 n.a. 66.9  
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Table 2.7 
Business Saving: 
Correlation with Household Saving and Business Investment 
 
Country Sample
Household 
Saving
Business 
Investment
Whole Sample -0.2197***  0.3655***
High Income OECD -0.2758*** 0.314***
High Income non-OECD -0.5142*** 0.7201***
Upper Middle Income -0.2203*** 0.4079***
Lower Middle Income -0.1823* 0.1944*
***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%  
 
Table 2.8 
Business Saving to Business Investment (in %) 
Weighted by PPP GDP 
 
Year/Income 
Group
High-income 
OECD
High-income 
Non-OECD 
Upper-middle 
income 
Lower-middle 
income 
Total
1995 96.7 102.1 61.7 34.5 87.9
1996 100.4 98.6 57.6 74.5 89.3
1997 98.6 87.6 57.7 93.3 88.3
1998 91.4 102.9 62.6 72.3 86.3
1999 90.5 59.9 64.6 95.5 86.6
2000 85.0 76.3 81.4 87.9 84.4
2001 92.6 78.2 86.6 116.4 91.9
2002 108.8 70.1 93.4 141.0 105.6
2003 115.2 85.8 87.6 125.7 107.5
2004 115.6 79.9 86.9 143.7 107.8
2005 113.0 75.3 86.4 131.5 105.3
2006 106.8 68.0 82.8 98.7 99.0
2007 98.8 52.6 81.9 80.2 92.7
2008 97.6 56.7 73.2 95.7 89.1
2009 139.9 51.5 80.3 107.5 117.5
2010 135.9 67.6 74.3 104.9 114.6
2011 126.8 88.6 70.4 110.5 107.2
2012 122.7 84.9 73.0 108.5 114.3
2013 116.4 n.a. 99.2 n.a. 116.1  
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Table 3.1 
Baseline Private Saving Rate Regressions 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged Private Saving 0.380*** 0.324*** 0.334*** 0.258*
(0.078) (0.079) (0.111) (0.151)
Business Saving Rate 0.590*** 0.527*** 0.520*** 0.552***
(0.114) (0.153) (0.172) (0.187)
Government Saving to GDP -0.180 -0.247* -0.346* -0.300*
(0.125) (0.130) (0.181) (0.154)
Per Capita GDP Growth 0.120 0.154 0.006 0.027
(0.091) (0.109) (0.119) (0.152)
Per Capita GDP Growth Volatility 0.122 -0.027 -0.024 -0.053
(0.126) (0.126) (0.151) (0.164)
Log Per Capita GDP 2.809 1.314 0.210 -1.265
(2.946) (2.894) (3.748) (4.259)
Old Dependency Ratio -0.156 -0.154 -0.107 -0.058
(0.108) (0.117) (0.196) (0.232)
Young Dependency Ratio -0.016 -0.074 -0.083 -0.114
(0.069) (0.091) (0.097) (0.138)
Real Interest Rate (log) 9.357
(9.289)
Urbanization Ratio -0.046 -0.039 0.013 0.049
(0.056) (0.064) (0.072) (0.090)
Private Credit Flow to GDP -0.011 -0.008 -0.004 -0.007
(0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
M2/GDP (log) 0.391 0.834 -0.614 -0.132
(2.056) (1.758) (2.706) (2.330)
Current Account Balance to GDP 0.153* 0.113 0.103
(0.086) (0.107) (0.121)
Terms of Trade (log) -1.471 -2.407
(3.709) (4.759)
Constant -18.750 -2.183 17.554 32.660
(19.215) (21.098) (31.564) (28.982)
Observations 597 596 556 432
Number of countries 47 47 47 42
AR(1) 0.00185 0.00361 0.0123 0.0370
AR(2) 0.235 0.0872 0.193 0.259
Hansen 0.159 0.112 0.186 0.920
Lags/Instruments 1/44 1/47 1/50 1/53
Standard errors in parentheses corrected by Windmeijer finite-sample correction.
***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%
Estimation: 2-step system GMM with Windmeijer (2005) small sample robust standard error 
correction and time effects
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Table 3.2 
Household Saving Rate Regressions 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged Household Saving 0.628*** 0.485*** 0.561*** 0.478***
(0.098) (0.096) (0.105) (0.131)
Business Saving Rate -0.320*** -0.461*** -0.372** -0.360**
(0.113) (0.146) (0.145) (0.165)
Government Saving to GDP -0.060 -0.261** -0.358*** -0.155
(0.099) (0.103) (0.127) (0.149)
Per Capita GDP Growth 0.141 0.218** 0.077 -0.150
(0.111) (0.085) (0.094) (0.117)
Per Capita GDP Growth Volatility -0.003 0.014 -0.107 -0.120
(0.151) (0.113) (0.157) (0.163)
Log Per Capita GDP -1.569 -0.201 0.509 -4.765*
(1.617) (2.224) (2.458) (2.799)
Old Dependency Ratio -0.045 -0.114 -0.025 -0.016
(0.088) (0.116) (0.163) (0.176)
Young Dependency Ratio -0.051 -0.085 -0.058 -0.190**
(0.048) (0.051) (0.075) (0.093)
Real Interest Rate (log) 3.176
(9.008)
Urbanization Ratio 0.025 -0.010 0.017 0.054
(0.042) (0.044) (0.046) (0.053)
Private Credit Flow to GDP 0.004 -0.001 -0.009 -0.003
(0.014) (0.012) (0.010) (0.007)
M2/GDP (log) 3.011** 1.395 -2.512 1.926
(1.354) (1.777) (1.643) (2.276)
Current Account Balance to GDP 0.223** 0.174** 0.153*
(0.087) (0.070) (0.078)
Terms of Trade (log) -3.184 -0.250
(4.575) (4.482)
Constant 9.797 11.602 30.280 51.223**
(12.862) (14.880) (33.295) (22.490)
Observations 597 596 556 432
Number of countries 47 47 47 42
AR(1) 0.00802 0.00736 0.0109 0.00931
AR(2) 0.530 0.166 0.615 0.816
Hansen 0.0556 0.0967 0.172 0.604
Lags/Instruments 1/44 1/47 1/50 1/53
Standard errors in parentheses corrected by Windmeijer finite-sample correction.
***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%
Estimation: 2-step system GMM with Windmeijer (2005) small sample robust standard 
error correction and time effects
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Table 3.3 
Additional Private Saving Rate Regressions 
 
(1) (2)
Pooled OLS Cross-Section
Lagged Private Saving 0.233***
(0.059)
Business Saving Rate 0.370*** 0.343**
(0.050) (0.159)
Government Saving to GDP -0.325*** -0.133
(0.049) (0.189)
Per Capita GDP Growth 0.024 0.821*
(0.056) (0.409)
Per Capita GDP Growth Volatility -0.074 -0.265
(0.056) (0.699)
Log Per Capita GDP 6.464*** 0.244
(1.468) (1.585)
Old Dependency Ratio -0.118 -0.241*
(0.108) (0.133)
Young Dependency Ratio 0.066 -0.118*
(0.074) (0.065)
Urbanization Ratio 0.150* -0.058
(0.088) (0.046)
Private Credit Flow to GDP -0.002 -0.281
(0.008) (0.184)
M2/GDP (log) 1.477** 3.714***
(0.691) (1.064)
Current Account Balance to GDP 0.272*** 0.526***
(0.037) (0.147)
Constant -67.172*** 9.743
(14.729) (15.871)
Observations 596 47
R-squared 0.770 0.754
Number of id 47 47
Robust Standard errors in parentheses
***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%  
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Table 3.4 
Baseline Private Investment Regressions 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lagged Business Investment 0.706*** 0.607*** 0.437*** 0.627*** 0.662*** 0.636***
(0.059) (0.097) (0.137) (0.080) (0.099) (0.095)
Business Saving Rate 0.075 0.127 0.130 0.081 0.139 0.171*
(0.088) (0.119) (0.092) (0.112) (0.086) (0.094)
Per Capita GDP Growth 0.366*** 0.362*** 0.278*** 0.378*** 0.367*** 0.319***
(0.079) (0.062) (0.094) (0.053) (0.063) (0.063)
Per Capita GDP Growth Volatility -0.053 -0.164 -0.206 -0.055 -0.128* -0.127
(0.081) (0.145) (0.221) (0.107) (0.070) (0.079)
Government Investment Rate to GDP -0.068 0.174 -0.194 0.015 0.127 0.284
(0.228) (0.326) (0.513) (0.326) (0.331) (0.378)
Private Credit Flow to GDP 0.011 0.014 0.007 0.015 0.014 0.015
(0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Log Per Capita GDP -0.261
(0.909)
(Private Credit/GDP above sample 
median=1) * Business Saving
-0.068
(0.046)
Investment Relative Price Level 1.351 0.655 1.937*
(1.849) (1.303) (1.058)
Capital Stock to GDP -2.015* 0.369 0.516
(1.182) (0.560) (0.555)
Total Factor Productivity (2005=1) 6.325 6.292 5.939
(4.685) (5.021) (5.684)
Constant 5.266 2.118 14.777** -2.115 -5.733 -7.142
(9.433) (2.490) (7.158) (4.473) (5.909) (7.361)
Observations 593 558 558 545 545 545
Number of countries 47 47 47 46 46 46
AR(1) 0.000133 0.000319 0.00671 0.000212 0.000448 0.000414
AR(2) 0.248 0.262 0.154 0.285 0.246 0.294
Hansen 0.387 0.216 0.0703 0.260 0.378 0.248
Lags/Instruments 1/38 1/37 1/37 1/37 1/43 1/46
***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%
Estimation: 2-step system GMM with Windmeijer (2005) small sample robust standard error correction and time effects. 
'Standard errors in parentheses corrected by Windmeijer finite-sample correction.
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Table 3.5 
Additional Private Investment Regressions (I) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged Business Investment 0.519*** 0.524***
(0.040) (0.048)
Business Saving Rate -0.014 0.008 0.405*** 0.317**
(0.038) (0.046) (0.120) (0.117)
Per Capita GDP Growth 0.275*** 0.270*** 1.220*** 1.542***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.316) (0.337)
Per Capita GDP Growth Volatility -0.239*** -0.253*** 0.093 -0.218
(0.049) (0.053) (0.487) (0.539)
Government Investment Rate to GDP -0.389*** -0.313** -0.119 0.196
(0.127) (0.135) (0.527) (0.459)
Private Credit Flow to GDP 0.019** 0.018* -0.019 -0.138
(0.010) (0.009) (0.154) (0.161)
Log Per Capita GDP 4.845*** -0.424
(1.291) (1.080)
Investment Relative Price Level 0.271 2.189
(1.237) (2.184)
Capital Stock to GDP -0.056 0.898*
(0.188) (0.500)
Total Factor Productivity (2005=1) 5.186** -3.853
(2.194) (13.283)
Constant -40.147*** 3.691 10.437 5.705
(12.182) (2.563) (10.751) (14.662)
Observations 593 545 47 46
R-squared 0.704 0.693 0.610 0.614
Number of countries 47 46 47 46
Robust Standard errors in parentheses
***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%, *Significant at 10%
Fixed (year) Effects Cross-section
 
38 
 
Table 3.6 
Additional Private Investment Regressions (II) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lagged Business Investment 0.626*** 0.533*** 0.389*** 0.557*** 0.554***
(0.065) (0.071) (0.122) (0.067) (0.098)
Business Saving Rate 0.184* 0.233** 0.193** 0.179* 0.254***
(0.100) (0.096) (0.078) (0.100) (0.083)
Business Saving Rate*Dummy [(Inv >= Sav)=1] 0.048 0.047 0.121 0.061 0.070
(0.077) (0.057) (0.079) (0.059) (0.067)
Dummy [(Inv >= Sav)=1] 0.813 0.991 -0.093 0.720 0.758
(1.317) (0.923) (1.239) (0.895) (1.024)
Per Capita GDP Growth 0.333*** 0.312*** 0.237*** 0.330*** 0.306***
(0.100) (0.050) (0.079) (0.045) (0.057)
Per Capita GDP Growth Volatility -0.069 -0.149 -0.194 -0.079 -0.145*
(0.075) (0.110) (0.172) (0.092) (0.074)
Government Investment Rate to GDP -0.091 0.020 -0.119 0.016 0.075
(0.227) (0.258) (0.394) (0.260) (0.269)
Private Credit Flow to GDP 0.007 0.007 0.003 0.008 0.008
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Log Per Capita GDP -0.086
(1.032)
Investment Relative Price Level 1.749 0.850
(1.379) (1.236)
Capital Stock to GDP -1.739 0.151
(1.197) (0.741)
Total Factor Productivity (2005=1) 5.033 3.915
(3.554) (4.565)
Constant 2.664 1.031 12.615* -1.776 -3.312
(11.680) (2.240) (6.648) (4.017) (6.185)
Observations 593 558 558 545 545
Number of countries 47 47 47 46 46
AR(1) 0.000141 0.000203 0.00554 0.000135 0.000491
AR(2) 0.103 0.106 0.0583 0.128 0.0904
Hansen 0.197 0.457 0.262 0.420 0.607
Lags/Instruments 1/44 1/43 1/43 1/43 1/49
Estimation: 2-step system GMM with Windmeijer (2005) small sample robust standard error correction and time effects. 
'Standard errors in parentheses corrected by Windmeijer finite-sample correction. ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 
5%, *Significant at 10%  
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Annex: Data 
Table A.1: Country Sample 
Country Period Country Period
Austria 1995-2013 Belarus 1995-2010
Belgium 1995-2013 Brazil 1995-2013
Czech Republic 1995-2013 Bulgaria 1998-2012
Denmark 1995-2013 Chile 1996-2013
Estonia 1995-2012 China 1995-2012
Finland 1995-2013 Colombia 1995-2012
France 1995-2013 Ecuador 1997-2013
Germany 1995-2013 Kazakhstan 1995-2009
Greece 1995-2013 Latvia 1995-2013
Hungary 1995-2013 Lithuania 1995-2012
Italy 1995-2013 Mexico 2003-2012
Japan 1995-2012 Romania 1995-2013
Korea, Rep. 1995-2013 Russian Federation 2002-2013
Netherlands 1995-2013 Serbia 1997-2011
Norway 1995-2013 South Africa 1995-2013
Poland 1995-2013
Portugal 1995-2013 Bolivia 1995-2011
Slovak Republic 1995-2013 Egypt 1996-2012
Slovenia 1995-2013 Guatemala 2001-2012
Spain 1995-2011 Honduras 2000-2013
Sweden 1995-2013 Morocco 1998-2011
Switzerland 1995-2012 Ukraine 1995-2012
United Kingdom 1995-2013
United States 1995-2013
Croatia 1996-2012
Cyprus 1995-2012
A. High Income OECD 
B. High Income non-OECD 
C. Upper Middle Income
D. Lower Middle Income
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Table A.2: Data Sources 
Source Website
United Nations National 
Accounts
http://data.un.org/Explorer.aspx?d=SNA
OECD http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=SNA_TABLE14A#
IBGE (for Brazil)
http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/economia/contasnacion
ais/2009/defaulttabzip.shtm
Banco de Guatemala (for 
Guatemala)
http://www.banguat.gob.gt/inc/main.asp?id=100281&aud=1&lan
g=1
Banco Central de 
Ecuador (for Ecuador)
http://contenido.bce.fin.ec/
IMF WEO
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/02/weodata/in
dex.aspx
WB WDI
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-
indicators
Penn World Table www.ggdc.net/pwt
Saving and Investment by Institutional Sector:
Other Statistical Sources:
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Table A.3: Summary Statistics 
1. Panel 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Percentile 25th Percentile 75th
Private Saving Rate 671 19.92 19.62 16.90 22.70
Business Saving Rate 671 13.87 13.89 11.14 16.50
Government Saving to GDP 671 2.27 2.01 -0.20 4.10
Per Capita GDP Growth 723 2.68 2.53 0.81 4.60
Per Capita GDP Growth Volatility 702 2.13 1.43 0.83 2.67
Log Per Capita GDP 723 9.85 9.97 9.31 10.47
Old Dependency Ratio 723 19.19 21.23 11.30 24.62
Young Dependency Ratio 723 31.65 26.48 22.39 33.02
Urbanization Ratio 723 68.80 68.86 58.75 78.27
Private Credit Flow to GDP 697 2.88 2.37 -0.30 5.84
M2/GDP (log) 696 4.19 4.16 3.78 4.71
Current Account Balance to GDP 720 -1.34 -1.62 -5.12 2.56
Terms of Trade (log) 628 4.62 4.60 4.55 4.64
Household Saving Rate 671 6.05 6.37 3.60 8.96
Real Interest Rate (log) 584 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.08
Business Investment Rate 667 14.87 14.04 11.63 17.12
Government Investment Rate to GDP 667 3.47 3.37 2.70 4.08
Investment Relative Price Level 682 0.77 0.77 0.54 0.96
Capital Stock to GDP 682 3.22 3.11 2.65 3.73
Total Factor Productivity (2005=1) 668 0.97 0.99 0.95 1.01  
 
2. Cross-Section 
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Variable Obs. Mean Median Percentile 25th Percentile 75th
Private Saving Rate 47 19.87 19.18 16.63 22.27
Business Saving Rate 47 13.86 13.25 11.52 16.90
Government Saving to GDP 47 2.36 2.17 0.30 3.80
Per Capita GDP Growth 47 2.71 2.05 1.41 3.86
Per Capita GDP Growth Volatility 47 2.16 1.95 1.33 2.69
Log Per Capita GDP 47 9.83 9.88 9.26 10.48
Old Dependency Ratio 47 18.94 21.22 10.72 24.57
Young Dependency Ratio 47 32.20 26.18 23.41 37.90
Urbanization Ratio 47 68.61 68.82 57.17 77.31
Private Credit Flow to GDP 47 2.82 2.50 1.31 3.76
M2/GDP (log) 47 4.18 4.11 3.75 4.79
Current Account Balance to GDP 47 -1.38 -1.61 -5.40 2.33
Business Investment Rate 47 14.92 14.70 11.95 17.09
Government Investment Rate to GDP 47 3.52 3.68 2.79 4.13
Investment Relative Price Level 47 0.78 0.72 0.55 1.01
Capital Stock to GDP 47 3.21 3.30 2.64 3.55
Total Factor Productivity (2005=1) 46 0.97 0.98 0.96 0.99  
